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NOTES
CONFLICT + INTEREST:
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND INFORMED CONSENT
IN HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH
SHANNON BENBOW*
I. INTRODUCTION
"The issue of patient protection is, at its very root, an ethical
question-not simply a legal or scientific question."'
During the 1980s, stock in biotechnology companies became
increasingly profitable. These companies worked with institu-
tional hospitals and research centers to develop drugs and poten-
tially life-saving treatments. The companies relied on physicians
at the hospitals and research centers to oversee and develop
medical research. In turn, those companies often gave the physi-
cians financial incentives in the form of stock options and licens-
ing agreements. Until recently, that practice remained virtually
unquestioned. Health care for profit became the standard, both
in routine medical care, such as Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions, and in clinical research. That changed in 1999 when alle-
gations of financial conflicts of interest and lack of informed
consent surfaced in a lawsuit involving gene therapy at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania.
In 1998, Jesse Gelsinger died while participating in a gene
therapy study at the University of Pennsylvania's Institute for
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2003; White Scholar, Thomas
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1. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PATIENT PROTECTION IN RESEARCH TRi-
A's § I(B) (Sept. 6, 2001), at http://www.fhcrc.org/response/patientprotection
committeereport.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy) [hereinafter HUTCH PATIENT PROTECTION REPORT].
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Human Gene Therapy ("IHGT").2 Gelsinger suffered from a
mild form of a rare metabolic disorder.3 Although the therapy
offered no benefit to him, Gelsinger agreed to participate in the
study to benefit others born with a more serious form of the con-
dition.4 Gelsinger's family and his estate brought suit against
those administering the experiment alleging, among other
things, that Gelsinger's physicians failed to obtain his informed
consent.5 According to the complaint, Dr. James Wilson, then
director of IHGT, founded Genovo, a biotech firm that provided
funding and stock options to IHGT.6 Because of their financial
stakes in Genovo, the complaint stated, the defendants stood to
gain financially from the success of the gene therapy experi-
ment.7 This fact, the plaintiffs alleged, proximately caused the
death of Jesse Gelsinger on September 17, 1999.8 The plaintiffs
asserted that the defendants failed to obtain Gelsinger's
informed consent because they did not adequately disclose the
extent of Dr. Wilson's and the University's financial interests in
the studies.9
2. Complaint of John Gelsinger 1 1, Gelsinger v. Trustees of the Univ. of
Penn., available at http://www.sskrplaw.com/links/healthcare2.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 13, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Pub-
lic Policy).
3. Id. 2.
4. Id.
5. Id. 110(e)-(f).
6. Id. 13-18. The relevant allegations state:
13. At all times relevant hereto, Dr. Wilson was the founder of defen-
dant Genovo, a biotech company. At all times relevant hereto, Dr.
Wilson controlled up to thirty percent (30%) of the Genovo com-
pany stock.
14. Genovo agreed to provide the IHGT with over four million dollars
a year for five years to conduct genetic research and
experimentation.
15. In lieu of up-front payments to the University, Gen ovo transferred
five percent (5%) equity ownership to the University.
16. In return for Genovo's sponsorship of genetic research and exper-
imentation, the University agreed to grant Genovo licenses for the
lung and liver applications for existing technologies developed by
defendant, Dr. Wilson.
17. Defendant, Genovo, retained an option to negotiate for licenses
for any future developments by defendants, IHGT and/or Dr.
Wilson.
18. The proposed licenses between the defendants included full pat-
ent reimbursement, milestone payments and royalties on product
sales.
7. Id. 35-36.
8. Id. 111.
9. Id. 110(e)-(f).
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The Gelsinger case opened discussions of the extent of
informed consent in research trials. The plaintiffs settled the
case, 10 and other courts have not yet ruled on the specific issue.
While the medical, legal, and patient communities continue to
debate the issue, many physicians and institutions still receive
funding and financial incentives from biotech companies, often
without disclosing those incentives in obtaining informed con-
sent.1' Two recent cases, filed against the Fred Hutchinson Can-
cer Research Center ("Hutch") in Seattle, not only highlight the
issue, but also illustrate its prevalence in the medical community.
The Hutch, described as the "Mecca" of cancer care centers,
enjoys a solid reputation in both the scientific and patient com-
munities.12 Its staff includes two Nobel Prize Laureates,"3 and its
federal grants in 2000 totaled $142 million. 4 In 2001, plaintiffs
in two separate cases filed suits against the Hutch in Seattle, cer-
tain physicians there, and Genetic Systems Corporation, a
biotech firm. 5 In one case, the plaintiff alleged that Kathryn
Hamilton, a Hutch patient, died as a result of participation in a
10. Gelsinger Settlement Press Release, at http://www.sskrplaw.com/
gene/pressrelease.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
11. To illustrate the pervasiveness of the issue, in June 2002, the New
England Journal of Medicine loosened its policy regarding publication of evalu-
ations of drugs by physicians who have a financial interest in the drug. Under
the new policy, the Journal will refuse publication to physicians only if they have
"significant" financial interests in manufacturers of the product, or their com-
petitors. Under the old policy, the Journal refused publication to physicians
with any financial interests in the manufacturer or its competitors. Jeffrey M.
Drazen, M.D. & Gregory D. Kurfman, M.D., Financial Associations of Authors, 346
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1901 (2002).
12. The Hutch is a Major Player in Cancer Care and Research, SEATrLE TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2001, at Al7.
13. FRED HUTCHINSON CANCER REs. CENTER, Our Nobel Prize Laureates, at
http://www.fhcrc.org/visitor/nobel/ (last modified June 18, 2002) (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
14. The Hutch is a Major Player in Cancer Care and Research, supra note 12.
15. Berman v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Ctr., No. CO1-0727R
(W.D. Wash. filed May 18, 2001), available at http://www.sskrplaw.com/gene/
berman/complaint.html (complaint) (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) (on file with
the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy), available at http://
www.fhcrc.org/response/126_.681/legal/berman-response.pdf (response) (last
visited Apr. 30, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy); Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Ctr., No. C01-
5217RSL (W.D. Wash. filed Mar. 29, 2001), available athttp://www.sskrplaw.com/
gene/wright/complaintl.html (complaint) (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy), available at http:/
/www.fhcrc.org/response/ 1 26_681 /legal/litigation-response.pdf (response)
(last visited Apr. 30, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics
& Public Policy). Because these cases are still pending as of the date of this
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study designed to develop a drug combination that would
counter some of the effects of high doses of chemotherapy, a
drug routinely administered to cancer patients. 6 In the other
case, a class of plaintiffs alleged that the Hutch and defendant
physicians, as a result of an agreement with Genetic Systems,
earned substantial profits after concealing some risks and misrep-
resenting the study in which the patients participated, Protocol
126.17 Both complaints allege that the researchers actively con-
cealed certain material information from the patients because
they stood to gain financially from the success of the experi-
ments."8 The cases against the Hutch highlight the extent of the
issue, drawing particular attention to the fact that even reputable
institutions are not shielded from allegations of patient
mistreatment.
With the recent attention to the issue of patient protection
in clinical research in general, and disclosure of financial incen-
tives in obtaining informed consent in particular, Representative
Diana DeGette introduced a bill in May 2002 aimed at reforming
patient protections.' 9 This Note will examine the issue of patient
protection and financial incentives in medical research in the
context of the doctrine of informed consent, detailing informed
consent, from the reasons behind its inception to early cases
promulgating the basic elements of the doctrine. Next, this Note
will discuss the current state of the doctrine, including instances
in which courts have extended the doctrine to issues beyond
medical risks, examining the role of Institutional Review Boards
in approving research and reviewing patient consent forms.
Finally, this Note sets forth recommendations for potential
changes, both in the law and within the medical research
community.
note, they are not discussed at length. Reference to them is meant to illustrate
the on-going conflict regarding this issue.
In March 2001, the Seattle Times published an investigative report detail-
ing the complaints in these two cases. See infra note 191.
16. Complaint of Allan Berman, supra note 15. Physicians generally
administer high doses of chemotherapy in preparation for a bone marrow
transplant.
17. Complaint of William Lee Wright, supra note 15, 21.
18. Complaint of Allan Berman, supra note 15, 101; Complaint of Wil-
liam Lee Wright, supra note 15, 21(10).
19. See infra notes 190-212 and accompanying text.
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II. THE INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE
A. The Roots of Informed Consent
The Hippocratic Oath ("Oath") established the physician's
duty to the patient.20 The first sentence of the Oath is simple, yet
straightforward: "Above all, do no harm."'" The Oath further
states, "I will use my power to help the sick to the best of my
ability and judgment; I will abstain from harming or wrongdoing
any man by it."22 Today, the Oath provides a foundation for
medical ethics. It sets forth the physician's duty to work in the
best interest of the patient, and to avoid harming, or suggesting
treatments that will harm, the patient.23 Physicians still endeavor
to abide by its mandates, making medicine a highly regarded
profession.
1. The Nuremberg Code
Despite the mandates of the Hippocratic Oath, however, his-
tory shows that some physicians used their knowledge and posi-
tion to harm patients, often under the umbrella of medical
research.24 The most notorious of these cases occurred through-
out Nazi concentration camps during the Holocaust.25 To guide
its verdicts in the Nuremberg Doctors Trial in 1947, the court
consulted the newly issued Nuremberg Code ("Code"), a ten-
point code that sets forth the guidelines for human experimenta-
20. For the complete text of the Oath, see http://www.sskrplaw.com/bio
ethics/oath.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) (on file with the Notre DameJour-
nal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
21. HIPPOCRATES, HIPPOCRATIC OATH (5th Cent. B.C.), available at http://
www.sskrplaw.com/bioethics/oath.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal
of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
22. Id.
23. Id. The Oath states, "I will not give [fatal drugs] to anyone if I am
asked, nor will I suggest any such thing." Id.
24. For an outline of such cases, see Alan Milstein, BIOETHIC CHRONOL-
OGY: A HISTORY OF BROKEN RULES, at http://www.sskrplaw.com/bioethics/chro-
nology.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
25. Some experiments included injecting Polish priests with Malaria,
burning Russian prisoners with Phosphor to determine the best treatment for
the scarring from Phosphor bombs and performing vivisection, or bone and
muscle grafting, experiments on Polish women. DOCUMENT F 321, FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL WAR COUNCIL AT NUREMBERG, THE COLLECTIVE "DAS LICHT"-
(THE LIGHT), available at http://www.technologyartist.com/concentration
camp/index.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Jour-
nal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). Other such experiments are listed in Mil-
stein, supra note 24.
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tion.2 The first sentence of the Code states, "[T]he voluntary
consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. '2 7 The
Code then sets forth the meaning of this mandate, stating:
This means that the person involved should have the legal
capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able
to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention
of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reach-
ing, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and
should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of
the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable
him to make an understanding and enlightened decision.
This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an
affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be
made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the
experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted;
all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the
effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his
participation in the experiment.2 8
Unlike domestic informed consent laws, the Nuremberg Code
applies to all research subjects, regardless of individual country
regulations. The international community, however, never
adopted the Code, leaving doubts as to whether it actually binds
researchers in any country.
29
2. The Roots of Informed Consent in the United States
Although the international community never adopted the
1949 Nuremberg Code as binding international law, U.S. courts
began enforcing informed consent during the early 1900s. In
1908, Mary Schloendorff entered a New York hospital with a
stomach disorder.3" After finding a lump in her stomach, her
physicians recommended an ether exam to determine the char-
acter of the lump." Ms. Schloendorff consented to the ether
exam, but specifically told her physicians that they should not
operate.32 The physicians performed the exam, and despite Ms.
SchloendorfFs instructions, operated to remove a tumor from
26. NUREMBERG CODE (1949), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/nurem
berg.php3 (on file with the Notre DameJournal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
27. Id. 1.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Dawn Joyce Miller, Research and Accountability: The Need for Uniform Reg-
ulation of International Pharmaceutical Drug Testing, 13 PACE INT'L L. REv. 197
(2001).
30. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
31. Id. at 93.
32. Id.
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her stomach at that time. Ms. Schloendorff sued the hospital
and physicians and, upon a verdict for the hospital, appealed the
case to the Court of Appeals.34
While Ms. Schloendorff appealed the case on other grounds,
it is better known for being the first to articulate the concept of
informed consent. In his opinion, then-Judge Cardozo wrote,
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a sur-
geon who performs an operation without his patient's consent com-
mits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."35
Forty-three years later, a California appellate court gave the
doctrine its name. 6 In Salgo v. Stanford University, Martin Salgo
sued Stanford University after becoming permanently paralyzed
following a diagnostic procedure at the University's hospital.37
Mr. Salgo testified that he was not told of the nature of the proce-
dure, including its details and possible risks.3" In its discussion of
the duty to disclose, the court stated:
A physician violates his duty to his patient ... if he with-
holds any facts that are necessary to form the basis of an
intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treat-
ment. Likewise, the physician may not minimize the
known dangers of a procedure or operation in order to
induce his patient's consent .... [I]n discussing the ele-
ment of risk a certain amount of discretion must be
employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts neces-
sary to an informed consent."9
Since then, the doctrine of informed consent has evolved into
both a common law and a statutory doctrine, requiring physi-
cians to disclose treatment risks and details to patients before
administering a proposed treatment.
B. The Current Doctrine
Early informed consent cases in the United States took a bat-
tery approach, that is, that the injury resulted from unauthorized
contact with the patient.4" As in Schloendorff plaintiffs would
claim that they did not authorize the physician to perform the
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Salgo v. Stanford Univ., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
37. Id. at 173-75.
38. Id. at 181.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. MATTHEW BENDER & Co., TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW
§ 17 .01[1] [a] (2001) [hereinafter HEALTH LAW TREATISE].
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procedure either, as Ms. Schloendorff had done, by explicitly
refusing such treatment, or because they did not authorize a pro-
cedure that held the risk that the physician did not disclose.
Today, the informed consent doctrine generally takes a negli-
gence approach, although plaintiffs can assert battery in some
circumstances. 41 A negligence claim does not require the plain-
tiff to show that the physician intentionally treated the patient
without the patient's informed consent. Instead, the plaintiff
must prove three elements: 1) the physician had a duty to pro-
vide the information; 2) the physician breached that duty by not
providing the relevant information; and 3) that breach proxi-
mately caused the patient's injury.42
1. The Physician's Duty
The first element, the physician's duty to provide certain
information, focuses on what kind of information the physician
should provide. Generally, the information that the physician
should disclose can be broken into five categories: diagnosis,
nature and purpose of the proposed treatment, risks and conse-
quences, possible alternative treatments, and the risks and conse-
quences of forgoing the proposed treatment.43  Physicians
generally disclose both the diagnosis and the nature and purpose
of the proposed treatment, and will generally discuss the conse-
quences of forgoing the proposed treatment with the patient.
44
The physician must disclose any recognized approach that pro-
vides reasonably feasible alternatives under the circumstances to
satisfy the requirement of disclosing possible alternative
treatments.
45
The risks and consequences category represents the most lit-
igated category of disclosure requirements.46 A plaintiff in an
informed consent case involving the risks and consequences cate-
41. Because battery is an intentional tort, the plaintiff claiming battery
must show that the physician intentionally committed the act that caused the
injury. Some situations in which the plaintiff may still assert battery are: a physi-
cian performs an operation even when the patient did not consent to the opera-
tion; a physician performs one type of operation, but the patient consented to
another; a physician obtains conditional consent, but disregards the condition.
Conditional consent may include, for example, a plaintiff consenting to a pro-
cedure only if the physician finds a malignancy. For a discussion of informed
consent claims involving battery, see Orduno v. Mowry, 2001 Cal. App. LEXIS
2698 (Cal. Ct. App.).
42. BRYAN A. LIANG, HEALTH LAW & POLIcY 29 (2000).
43. HEALTH LAw TREATISE, supra note 40, § 17.02[2].
44. Id. § 17.02[2][a], [b], [e].
45. Id. § 17.02[2][e].
46. Id. § 17.02[2][c].
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gory generally claims that the patient would have forgone the
treatment if the physician had disclosed the omitted information
regarding the risk. The plaintiff, however, cannot reasonably
require the physician to disclose all risks.4 7 For example, a physi-
cian need not disclose risks that are so slight or insignificant that
they do not merit disclosure, or risks that are commonly
known.48 Additionally, physicians do not need to disclose risks if
they determine that they should withhold disclosure based on
"therapeutic privilege" or if emergency circumstances require
the physician to administer the treatment before obtaining the
patient's consent.49 Disclosure under the risks and conse-
quences category requires the physician to determine which risks
warrant disclosure. Today, states generally take one of two
approaches to determining which risks the physician should dis-
close: the physician-centered approach and the patient-centered
approach.
2. The Physician-Centered Approach
The physician-centered approach requires the physician to
disclose material risks and benefits that a reasonable physician
would disclose in similar circumstances.5" This approach is con-
sistent with medical malpractice claims in that it alleges that the
physician departed from common practice among physicians
generally.5' The first case to articulate the approach, Natanson v.
Kline,12 stated that the physician's duty to disclose is limited to
the information that a reasonable medical practitioner would dis-
close under the same or similar circumstances.5" The physician-
centered approach requires the plaintiff to bring expert wit-
nesses to testify as to what a reasonable physician would disclose
in those circumstances. The "reasonable physician" standard,
however, does not account for the unique circumstances that are
inherent in every physician's decision to disclose certain risks to a
specific patient, and every patient's decision to undergo treat-
ment based on the disclosed risks.
3. The Patient-Centered Approach
In 1972, a circuit court held, in Canterbury v. Spence, that phy-
sicians should determine whether to disclose certain information
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. LtANG, supra note 42, at 38, 40.
50. Id. at 29.
51. HEALTH LAW TRE-ATISE, supra note 40, § 17.0311] [a].
52. 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
53. Id. at 1106.
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based on the information that a patient would want to know in
deciding whether to undergo the treatment, giving rise to the
patient-centered approach.54 This approach requires the physi-
cian to disclose material risks and relevant treatment alternatives
that a patient would want to know to make an informed deci-
sion." The approach is further divided into a subjective
approach and an objective approach. The subjective approach
asks whether the particular patient would have chosen to forgo
the treatment had the physician disclosed the omitted informa-
tion. This requires the plaintiff to show that the omitted infor-
mation was so material to the patient's decision that the patient
would have forgone the treatment had the information been dis-
closed. Because plaintiffs bring informed consent claims follow-
ing injury, the subjective approach requires the plaintiff to show
that even if the treatment had not resulted in injury, the patient
still would have chosen to forgo the treatment.
The objective approach remedies the hindsight that the sub-
jective approach requires. The objective approach asks whether
a reasonable patient in similar circumstances would choose to
forgo the treatment if the physician disclosed the omitted infor-
mation. Thus, the approach does not require speculation as to
whether a particular patient would have chosen to forgo the
treatment, which requires knowing the patient's state of mind
and unique circumstances and considerations.
In Canterbury, the court determined that a patient's right to
self-determination "shapes the boundaries of the [physician's]
duty to reveal."56 The court further stated, "The scope of the
physician's communications to the patient, then, must be mea-
sured by the patient's need, and that need is the information
material to the decision."57 The physician-based standard, the
court determined, is flawed for two reasons. First, the court ques-
tioned whether a professional consensus requiring disclosures
actually could exist in the medical community. 8 Circumstances
unique to a particular situation could cause a physician to deter-
mine that disclosure would not be necessary, while the same phy-
sician may, in a different circumstance, determine that disclosure
would be necessary for the patient to make an informed deci-
sion.59 Second, the court determined that the physician-based
approach ignores the patient's right to self-determination, and
54. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
55. LANc, supra note 42, at 30.
56. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 783-84.
59. Id.
CONFLICT + INTEREST
instead "bind [s] the disclosure obligation to medical usage [and
arrogates] the decision on revelation to the physician alone. 6 °
Since Canterbury, approximately twenty-three states have adopted
the patient-centered approach, while some continue to apply the
physician-centered approach, and others have adopted neither a
physician-centered nor a patient-centered approach.61
While there is still no consensus on which standard a court
should use to determine whether a physician had a duty to dis-
close the omitted information, courts agree that the breach of
the physician's duty is not adequate to establish the physician's
liability.62 The plaintiff must also show that the patient suffered
an injury and that the injury resulted from the physician's non-
disclosure. Showing that the patient would have forgone treat-
ment, and thus would have escaped the resulting injury, had the
physician disclosed the omitted information, generally shows
causation.6"
While informed consent in research parallels informed con-
sent in clinical treatment, the unique circumstances of research
call for special considerations in obtaining informed consent.
Addressing this need, recent informed consent cases have
expanded the doctrine beyond medical risks that are inherent in
the procedure.
III. INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL RESEARCH
A. The Moore Decision
In 1990, the California Supreme Court considered whether
informed consent should extend to research and financial inter-
ests.6 4 The plaintiff, John Moore, sought treatment for hairy-cell
leukemia at the Medical Center of the University of California at
Los Angeles ("UCLA Hospital").65 He visited the UCLA Hospital
strictly to treat his leukemia, and he did not agree to participate
in research there.66 His physician, however, discovered in the
course of Moore's treatment, that Moore's cells could be
extremely valuable in research.6" During the course of Moore's
60. Id. at 784.
61. HEALTH LAw TREATISE, supra note 40, § 17.03[4].
62. Id. § 17.04.
63. Id.
64. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
65. Id. at 480.
66. Id. at 481.
67. Id. The potential value of Moore's cells was a direct result of an over-
production of a protein called a lymphokine. Lymphokines are produced by
certain white blood cells, called T-cells, and regulate the immune system. Some
forms of this protein have potential therapeutic value. The genetic code
2003]
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treatment, the physician and other defendants actively
researched samples taken from Moore for the sole purpose of
research, rather than treatment. 6 Eventually, the defendants
developed and patented a cell line using Moore's cells.69 During
this time, the defendants concealed their research interests from
Moore, leading Moore to believe that his physician performed
every procedure for the purpose of treatment, when in fact some
procedures only related to research. v Moore brought an action
against the defendants for, among other things, lack of informed
consent, alleging that the physician did not obtain Moore's con-
sent to perform certain procedures because he was never told of
the physician's research or financial interests in his cells.
71
The court analyzed the informed consent issue based on the
three principles of informed consent: adults of sound mind have
the right, in exercising control over their bodies, to determine
whether to submit to lawful medical treatment; the patient's con-
sent to treatment must be an informed consent; and a physician
has a fiduciary duty to disclose all information that would be mate-
rial to the patient's decision. 72 The court recognized that most
plaintiffs bringing informed consent cases allege that the physi-
cian failed to disclose a medical risk.73 Despite this, however, the
court determined that informed consent may extend to personal
and financial interests, stating, "[A] physician must disclose per-
sonal interests unrelated to the patient's health, whether
research or economic, that may affect the physician's profes-
sional judgment .... -7' The court recognized that California law
requires physicians to disclose some non-medical information in
obtaining a patient's informed consent.75 That information may
responsible for producing the protein, if identified, can be used to produce
large quantities of the protein in a lab. The genetic code, however, is extremely
difficult to locate because the T-cells produce more than one type of this pro-
tein. Moore's T-cells overproduced certain of these proteins, making it easier
to find the corresponding genetic code. These cells taken from Moore were
used to develop a cell line, which is a cell culture that can reproduce indefi-
nitely. Because most cell lines are difficult to develop, a successful cell line has
a huge market potential. Id. at 481 n.2.
68. Id. at 481.
69. Id. at 482.
70. Id. at 481.
71. Id. at 482-83.
72. Id. at 483 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (1972)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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include funding sources in research or referrals for which the
physician stands to benefit. 76
In determining that informed consent may extend to finan-
cial interests, the court discussed the competing roles of the phy-
sician in treatment and research. A physician who treats a
patient recommends and performs certain procedures based on
the potential benefit in relation to the potential risks.77 The
patient's needs represent the determining factor in medical
treatment. A physician will not utilize treatment that does not
stand to provide any material benefit to the patient. A researcher,
however, seeks to use the patient to develop potentially benefi-
cial treatments. In most research cases, the patient knows that
the treatment is not fully developed. Patients understand that,
while the treatment may provide no lasting value to them, other
patients in the future may benefit from the knowledge gained
during the research. Thus, the researcher is driven not by the
patient's own needs, but by a research interest that may offer
only marginal, if any, benefit to the patient.
78
According to the Moore court, the physician who has a
research interest in the patient may, consciously or uncon-
sciously, take that interest into consideration in recommending
certain procedures. 79 Thus, the physician has a duty to disclose
certain outside interests so patients may determine their own
course of treatment.8" The court held that these outside inter-
ests include "personal interests unrelated to the patient's health,
whether research or economic, that may affect [the physician's]
medical judgment. 8 1
While the Moore court determined that a physician should
disclose financial conflicts in the patient consent form, the court
considered only disclosures where patients are not actually aware
of research interests in their treatment. Patients agreeing to par-
ticipate in medical research are aware of a research interest in
their treatment. In fact, many patients participate in research
because that research presents the best hope for successful
treatment.
76. Id. at 484 (citing Bus. & PROF. § 654.2, and HEALTH & SAFETY
§ 24176).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 485.
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B. The Belmont Report
Before Moore, Congress, addressing the need for basic ethi-
cal principles underlying human subject research, signed the
National Research Act into law,82 which created the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical
and Behavioral Research ("Research Commission").83 In
response to its charge to develop guidelines to follow to ensure
that researchers apply those basic ethical principles to biomedi-
cal research, the Research Commission issued the Belmont
Report.8 4 Rather than establishing specific recommendations,
the Research Commission set to provide guidelines that would
create a framework for determining the ethical course of action
in resolving specific ethical problems and would not be outdated
by advances in medicine that otherwise may not fall under more
specific recommendations.8 5 The Belmont Report establishes
three ethical principles as the underlying principles in human
subject research: Respect for Persons, Beneficence, andJustice. 86
1. Respect for Persons
The first category, Respect for Persons, incorporates two eth-
ical beliefs: that individuals are autonomous and that those indi-
viduals with diminished autonomy should be protected.8 7 The
first belief, that individuals are autonomous, requires acknowl-
edging that people are capable of deliberating decisions and act-
ing upon their deliberations.8 8 To respect that autonomy is to
allow the individual to make those choices without obstructing
those choices unless they may harm others.8 9 To show a lack of
respect for the individual's autonomy is to "repudiate that per-
son's considered judgments, to deny an individual the freedom
to act on those considered judgments, or to withhold information
necessary to make a considered judgment, when there are no
compelling reasons to do so. '"9° Thus, Respect for Persons
requires that research subjects enter into the research both vol-
82. National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
83. Id. § 201, 88 Stat. 348.
84. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN BIOMEDI-
CAL AND BEHAV. RES., THE BELMONT REPORT (1979), available at http://ohsr.od.
nih.gov/mpa/belmont.php3 (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Eth-
ics & Public Policy) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT].
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. pt. B-1.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
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untarily and with sufficient information. In determining whether
certain information is necessary to an informed consent, the Bel-
mont Report suggests that researchers use a variation of the rea-
sonable patient standard,91 the standard of the "reasonable
volunteer."92 The reasonable volunteer standard allows patients
to consider the issues that are important to a fully informed
choice to participate in research, while acknowledging an aware-
ness that the research may not be beneficial to them, and, in fact,
may not be fully understood. 93
2. Beneficence
The second principle, Beneficence, requires that research-
ers and research institutions engage in efforts to secure the well
being of the research subjects.94 While the Belmont Report
acknowledges that the term "Beneficence" generally refers to acts
of kindness or charity that exceed strict obligation, Beneficence
in medical research is itself a strict obligation.95 That obligation
encompasses two requirements, avoiding harm and maximizing
benefits while minimizing risks.96 While those tasks fall to
researchers and research institutions, the Belmont Report
charges society at large with the obligation to recognize both the
long-term benefits and risks that may result from medical
research.97 Society's recognition of the long-term risks and bene-
fits that may result from medical research allows communities to
hold institutions and lawmakers accountable for practices and
policies that protect patients. As a result, an informed society
will ensure that the law adjusts to changes in the research
environment.
3. Justice
The Belmont Report recognizes the final ethical principle in
medical research as Justice, or "[w] ho ought to receive the bene-
fits of research and bear its burdens[.] '' 8 Thus, an injustice
occurs when one person is wrongfully denied a benefit or unduly
bears a burden. Recognizing a commitment to Justice, institu-
tions must consider whether one group bears a burden without
reaping the benefits or whether a particular group bears an
91. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
92. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 84, pt. C-1.
93. Id.
94. Id. pt. B-2.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. § B(3).
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entire burden, when the benefit spreads beyond that group.99
For instance, the Belmont Report identifies the Tuskegee syphilis
study, where researchers studied one particular population, even
when that disease was not restricted to that population.1"'
4. Application
In discussing the three ethical principles, as well as placing
issues in research within those principles, the Research Commis-
sion recognized that adhering to one principle does not make
research ethical.' 0 ' Instead, researchers and research institu-
tions must consider each principle in planning and implement-
ing research. Thus, while the Commission recognizes informed
consent as an important, and even necessary, component of ethi-
cal research, even perfect disclosure will not ensure ethical
research. 1
02
C. The Declaration of Helsinki
While the Belmont Report recognized the need for patient
protection in the United States, the World Medical Association,
recognizing patient protection as a world-wide need, issued the
Declaration of Helsinki in 1964.1"' The Declaration of Helsinki
("Declaration"), like the Nuremberg Code, is an international
document, which does not carry legal effect in the international
community. Unlike the Nuremberg Code, however, the Declara-
tion does carry effect within the international medical commu-
nity, and has been amended several times, most recently in 2000,
to reflect the changing medical research environment. 10 4 The
Declaration sets forth legal principles that members of the World
Medical Association must follow in engaging in medical research
involving human subjects. It not only addresses the basic princi-
ples of medical research, but also instances, as in Moore, in which
physicians combine medical research with medical care. 10 5
99. Id.
100. Id. During the 1940s, U.S. researchers studied the untreated course
of syphilis on poor, rural, African-American men, even though syphilis was not
confined to that particular population. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. WORLD MED. Assoc., DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HuMAN SUBJECTS, (1964, amend. 2000),
available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/17-c-e.html (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter DECLARATION OF
HELSINKI].
104. Id.
105. Id.
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The Declaration acknowledges that medical advancement
relies on research that ultimately involves human subjects.1"6
Acknowledging the value of human research, however, the Decla-
ration requires the researcher-physician to assess the predictable
risks and burdens and compare them to the foreseeable benefits
to both the patient and others.1"7 The Declaration's impact on
medical research, however, is not that it requires informed con-
sent, but that it requires that researchers submit research plans,
or protocols, to an independent ethical review committee."0 8
The United States refers to these committees as "Institutional
Review Boards" ("IRBs"). The Declaration requires that the IRB
approve research protocols according to the laws and regulations
of the country in which the research is performed."0 9 In addi-
tion, the IRB has the right to monitor ongoing trials. ° In that
regard, the Declaration requires the researcher to provide moni-
toring information to the IRB, "especially any serious adverse
events.""' Finally, the Declaration requires that the researcher
inform the IRB of "information regarding funding, sponsors,
institutional affiliations, other potential conflicts of interest and incen-
tives for subjects.""' 2
D. The Institution's Role in Disclosure Determinations:
Institutional Review Boards
In 1974, following guidelines set forth in the Declaration of
Helsinki, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
promulgated regulations establishing IRBs.1 3  IRBs in the
United States are charged with overseeing and approving
research protocols for research involving human participants.1 14
Each IRB is responsible for protecting the rights of those partici-
pants, both before the research commences and during the
106. Id. A(4).
107. Id. B(16). This requirement, the Declaration states, does not nec-
essarily preclude research on healthy participants.
108. Id. B(13).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. OFFICE FOR HuMAN RESOURCE PROTECTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
BOARD GUIDEBOOK (1993), available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/irb/irb-
guidebook.htm (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy) [hereinafter IRB GUIDEBOOK]; IRB regulations are codified at 21 C.F.R.
§ 56 (FDA requirements), and 45 C.F.R. § 46 (HHS requirements). For further
discussion of the FDA and HHS requirements, see infra notes 118-127 and
accompanying text.
114. IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 113, ch. I(A).
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research period.115 The IRB is an institutional body, and each
research institution must establish at least one IRB to review its
research protocols.1 16 Alternatively, an institution can submit its
protocols to another institution's IRB for review.
1 17
1. Government Regulation of IRBs
Both the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") and the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") regulate
human research in general, and IRBs in particular. As a result,
there is no uniform standard to apply to IRB evaluations of
research protocols. FDA and HHS requirements are substantially
similar, however, making compliance with both FDA and HHS
regulations relatively simple. The regulations apply to different
types of research: HHS regulations apply to research involving
human subjects that is supported either entirely or partially by
HHS or conducted by HHS. 1 8 FDA regulations, on the other
hand, apply to all research involving products that the FDA regu-
lates, including research and marketing permits for drugs. 1 9
Research that is subject to both HHS and FDA regulations must
meet both sets of regulations. 20
2. IRB Membership
Both the FDA and HHS require that IRBs include at least
five members, although the IRB need not limit the number of
members.1 2 1 The membership should reflect varying back-
grounds, and IRB members should possess qualifications
through experience and expertise to safeguard the rights of the
human subjects. 1 2 2 Additionally, the laws regulating IRBs recog-
nize the unique needs of each research institution, medical com-
munity, and the community surrounding the institution. In
appointing members, IRBs should take these factors into consid-
eration. 12' Both FDA and HHS regulations state:
The IRB shall be sufficiently qualified through the experi-
ence and expertise of its members, and the diversity of the
115. Id.
116. Id. ch. I(B).
117. Id.
118. HHS Policy for Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101
(2001).
119. Institutional Review Boards General Provisions, 21 C.F.R. § 56.101
(2001).
120. IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 113, ch. II(B).
121. 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(a); 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a).
122. 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(a); 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a).
123. 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(a); 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a).
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members, including consideration of race, gender, and
cultural backgrounds and sensitivity to such issues as com-
munity attitudes, to promote respect for its advice and
counsel in safeguarding the rights and welfare of human
subjects. 124
While IRB guidelines require expertise, members of only
one profession cannot compose an IRB's entire membership.'
25
In that regard, the IRB must include at least one member whose
primary concern involves scientific considerations and one whose
considerations are primarily non-scientific. 126 To assure inde-
pendence, at least one member must be independent of the
research institution.'2 7 The IRB should draw the independent
member from the institution's community at large. 128 Possible
members include lawyers, who possess familiarity with laws regu-
lating the institution, or ministers, who are familiar with ethical
and religious considerations in the community. 29 Regardless of
the member's profession, that person should be knowledgeable
about the local community, and willing and able to discuss the
proposed research from that perspective. 3 ° Additionally, the
IRB should ensure that the community member is not subject to
intimidation by the IRB's non-independent members.'
3. IRB Protocol Review
Generally, any research involving human subjects must be
submitted to the IRB for approval. This is called "protocol
review." Research exempted from IRB approval includes educa-
tional testing, surveys in which the researcher will record no
identifying information that can link the subjects to the data, and
research involving existing data or specimens where the
researcher will record no data that can link the subject to the
information or specimen.'1 2 In reviewing research protocols, the
IRB should consider the principal investigator's qualifications,
the protocol's risks versus benefits to both the subjects and soci-
ety, and whether the informed consent procedure is adequate.13 3
124. 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(a); 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a).
125. 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(b); 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(b).
126. 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(c); 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(c).
127. 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(d); 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(d).
128. IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 113, ch. I(B).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b).
133. IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 113, ch. I(C) (qualifications), ch. III(A)
(risk/benefit analysis), ch. III(B) (informed consent).
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Consideration of the principal investigator's qualifications
should include the investigator's professional development and
the related degree of the protocol's complexity and risk to the
subjects.13 4 Researchers must submit their protocols to the IRB,
including provisions for the protection of research subjects and
sample informed consent documents.' 3 5 The researcher, how-
ever, is not required to submit documentation of potential con-
flicts of interest, including financial conflicts of interest.
4. Risk/Benefit Analysis
After reviewing the research protocol, the IRB must perform
a risk/benefit analysis. The anticipated benefits to the research
subjects or society must justify the accompanying risks posed to
the subjects from their participation.136 Following the "reasona-
ble volunteer" standard,1 3 7 the IRB must evaluate the risks based
on the conditions that make the research dangerous to the sub-
ject per se, not based on the chances that specific individuals are
willing to undertake to achieve their goals. 13 8 The IRB must then
determine whether the anticipated benefit justifies asking any
person to take that risk.13 9
In determining whether an anticipated benefit outweighs a
risk, the IRB must identify and assess the risks, determine
whether it can minimize the risks as much as possible, identify
the anticipated benefits, determine whether those benefits out-
weigh the risks, assure that the subjects will be given an accurate
description of the risks, and determine how often the IRB should
review the investigation during the course of the research. 4
In identifying and assessing the risks, the IRB should con-
sider physical, psychological, social, and economic risks.' Physi-
cal harms include exposure to minor pain, discomfort or injury
from medical procedures, and possible side effects of drugs. 42
Psychological harms include changes in thought processes or
emotions.'4 3 Those harms also encompass stress and feelings of
guilt, which generally result from behavioral research. 44 Addi-
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. ch. Ill(A).
137. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
138. IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 113, ch. 111(A).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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tionally, the IRB may consider invasion of privacy and breach of
confidentiality as psychological harms. 4 5 Likewise, breach of
confidentiality may result in social or economic harms because it
could lead to embarrassment within a subject's business or social
group or in criminal prosecution. 146 IRBs should be particularly
sensitive to information regarding drug abuse, mental illness,
illegal activities or sexual behavior, or behavioral research that
may "label" or stigmatize the subjects, resulting in social or eco-
nomic harms.' 47 To the extent that the IRB determines that the
protocol does present these risks to the subjects, the IRB should
assure that those risks are minimized without negatively affecting
the integrity of the research. Despite its extensive role, however,
the IRB is not responsible for determining whether a conflict of
interest may result in additional risks to the subjects.
5. Disclosure Determinations
Following its assessment of the risks, the IRB must then
determine whether subjects are adequately informed of those
risks when the researchers obtain informed consent. In deter-
mining whether the informed consent process is adequate, the
IRB should consider "that informed consent is an ongoing pro-
cess, not a piece of paper or a discrete moment in time." 4 '
HHS regulations require that certain information be pro-
vided to research subjects in obtaining informed consent. 49
That information includes an explanation of the purposes and
duration of the research, 150 a description of reasonably foresee-
able risks, 5 ' a description of the benefits to the subject or others
that are reasonably expected as a result of the research, 52 a dis-
closure of alternative treatments that may be available to the sub-
ject, 15 a disclosure of the measures the institution will take to
preserve the patient's confidentiality,1 54 a description of any
compensation or treatment that is available should the patient
suffer injury as a result of a risk, 55 the names of people or insti-
tutions the subject can contact to answer additional questions or
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. ch. II(B).
149. HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.116(a) (2001).
150. Id. § 46.116(a) (1).
151. Id. § 46.116(a) (2).
152. Id. § 46.116(a) (3).
153. Id. § 46.116(a) (4).
154. Id. § 46.116(a) (5).
155. Id. § 46.116(a)(6).
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if the subject suffers an injury,1 6 and a statement that participa-
tion in the research is voluntary and that the subject may discon-
tinue participation at any time.
157
HHS does not require that the researcher disclose any con-
flicts of interest, including financial conflicts, in obtaining
informed consent. The IRB, however, may determine that inves-
tigators should disclose certain other information. The IRB
Guidebook requires the IRB to take the patient-centered
approach to those disclosures, stating that "the IRB should
attempt to view the matter from the subject's perspective by ask-
ing what facts the subjects might want to know before deciding
whether or not to participate in the research. '15' As the
Gelsinger and Hutch cases illustrate, 159 IRB approval and review
of research protocols does not shield research teams and institu-
tions from allegations of misconduct, particularly as those allega-
tions relate to financial conflicts of interest. Current institutional
responses to those allegations, however, address the need for an
IRB's awareness of and focus on those conflicts of interest.
IV. RESPONSES TO CRITICISMS AND CONCERNS
A. Institutional Responses: The Hutch's Response
In March 2001, in response to criticisms related to its policy
regarding financial conflicts of interest, 6 ° the Hutch formed a
committee, called the Committee for Patient Protection in
Research Trials ("Patient Protection Committee"), to review its
policies and procedures. The Patient Protection Committee's
review included a review of the Hutch's two IRBs, its informed
consent process, and its conflict of interest and financial disclo-
sure policies.1 61 In reviewing these areas, the Patient Protection
Committee consulted independent reviewers, who are consid-
ered experts in their fields, to submit reports and recommenda-
tions after extensively studying the Hutch's policies.' 6 2
In submitting its findings, the Patient Protection Committee
called particular attention to the Hutch's financial conflict of
interest policy, recommending that the Hutch institute an out-
right ban on all financial conflicts of interest. 6 ' The Hutch later
156. Id. § 46.116(a)(7).
157. Id. § 46.116(a)(8).
158. IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 113, ch. III(B).
159. See supra notes 2-18 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
161. HUTCH PATIENT PROTECTION REPORT, supra note 1, § II.
162. Id.
163. Id. § III(A) (2) (a).
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adopted those recommendations.' 64  The independent
reviewer's report on conflicts of interest and financial disclosure
policies, however, sets forth a less drastic standard that allows
researchers to maintain those financial interests while assuring
patient protection.65 The independent reviewer's report recom-
mended implementing a policy requiring investigators with
financial interests totaling more than $8,000 from one company
per year, to disclose those interests in their publications and
presentations.' 66 Additionally, the report recommended that
investigators with financial interests related to their research dis-
close those interests to their colleagues. 167 Presumably, this dis-
closure would cause the investigator's peers to scrutinize the
investigator's work should questions arise regarding indepen-
dence. Next, the report recommended that the Hutch consider
all equity interests in privately held companies significant finan-
cial interests, regardless of the current value of the company. 168
Recognizing the role of IRBs in reviewing financial conflicts of
interest, the report additionally recommended that the IRB
review financial conflicts in studies annually, rather than solely at
a study's initial review.' 69
In reviewing the policies and procedures of the Hutch's
IRBs and informed consent process, the independent reviewers
departed from the Committee's recommendation of an outright
ban on financial conflicts of interest. The reviewers recom-
mended that the Hutch manage financial conflicts of interest, not
its IRBs, and that researchers should not disclose financial con-
flicts to patients in obtaining informed consent, stating that
"[s]ick patients who are contemplating enrollment in clinical
164. FRED HUTCHINSON CANCER RES. CENTER BD. OF TRUSTEES, PATIENT
PROTECTION OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE PROGRESS REPORT (2002), at http://www.
fhcrc.org/response/patientprotection/ppoc-report_2002.pdf (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
165. See Margaret L. Dale, REVIEWER REPORT ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST
AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, at http://www.fhcrc.org/response/patientprotec
tion/att -d.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal
of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter DALE REPORT].
166. Id. at 11.
167. Id.
168. Id. The Hutch's policies regarding financial conflicts of interest as
of the date of the Dale Report restricted Hutch representatives from participat-
ing in transactions involving the Hutch if the representative, or a member of
the representative's family, had or would receive a significant economic inter-
est, or if the transaction involved a business in which the representative, or a
member of the representative's family, had or would receive a significant eco-
nomic interest. HUTCH PATIENT PROTECTION REPORT § II(D).
169. DALE REPORT, supra note 165, at 12.
2003]
204 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
research are usually not in a position to weigh the significance of
financial disclosure issues relative to their care. 17 °
B. Government Response: The Office of Human Research Protection
Recognizing the need for uniform guidelines, in January
2001, the Office of Human Research Protection ("OHRP"), a
division of HHS, issued its Draft Interim Guidance regarding
financial conflicts of interest in human research. 171 Responding
to issues raised in the Gelsinger case 1 7 2 and to five new initiatives
to strengthen human subject research protection, announced by
then-Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, in
May 2000, the OHRP set forth guidelines for responding to, min-
imizing, and disclosing financial incentives ("Draft Interim Gui-
dance"). The guidelines address five areas: institutional
considerations, clinical investigators, IRB members, IRB review
of protocols, and consent documents and informed consent.
173
1. Institutional Financial Conflicts of Interest
In addressing institutional considerations, the OHRP noted
that not only do representatives of the institutions possess finan-
cial conflicts of interest, but, increasingly, the institution itself
possesses those conflicts, often in the form of agreements with
corporations that benefit both entities.174 Those conflicts may
directly influence how an institution conducts a trial, including
how it enrolls subjects, how it reports adverse events, and how it
evaluates trial data. 175 Noting that many institutions have already
established a Conflict of Interest Committee, the OHRP deter-
mined that institutions should actively gather information
regarding conflicts of interest and submit that information to
both the Conflict of Interest Committee and the institution's
IRB. 176 Because institutions often possess significant financial
interests in research, the OHRP suggested that IRBs, as institu-
170. ERNEST PRENTICE & GWENN OKI, REVIEWER REPORT ON INSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW BOARD AND INFORMED CONSENT PROCESS 15, at http://www.fhcrc.org/
response/patientprotection/att b.pdf (June 1, 2001) (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter PRENTICE/OKI
REPORT].
171. OFF. FOR HUM. RES. PROTECTIONS, DRAFT INTERIM GUIDANCE (2001),
available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/nhrpac/mtgl2-00/finguid.htm (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter
DRAFT INTERIM GUIDANCE].
172. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
173. DRAFT INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 171.
174. Id. § 1.6.
175. Id.
176. Id. § 1.1.
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tional entities, may be subject to institutional pressures to
approve protocols, turning a blind eye to financial conflicts of
interest. 77 To prevent institutional pressures, IRB members
from outside of the institution, with no financial relationships to
the institution, should actively participate in the review
process. 1 7
2. The Investigator's Financial Conflicts of Interest
IRB members should be aware of, and actively review, any
financial conflicts that the institution or its clinical investigator
may have. The Draft Interim Guidance sets forth policies that
institutions and IRBs should employ when clinical investigators
have financial conflicts. 179 In determining whether an investiga-
tor's financial interests present a conflict, the IRB should con-
sider whether the relationship leads the investigator to prefer
one outcome over another.18 As the Draft Interim Guidance
states, "Influenced by a financial incentive, an investigator may,
even if unwittingly, color the [informed] consent discussion in a
manner that encourages participation by subdy minimizing the
presentation of risks or overstating the benefits." ' 1 Should an
investigator and a sponsor enter into a financial agreement, the
Draft Interim Guidance recommends that the institution's Con-
flict of Interest Committee review the agreement. 8 2 If the Con-
flict of Interest Committee determines that the researcher
cannot avoid the conflict, it should determine how to best reduce
and manage the conflict, and share that determination with the
institution's IRB for consideration during its review of the proto-
col. '83  The IRB members, in addition, should determine
whether they have any potential financial conflict of interest
related to the protocols they review. 84 Members who determine
that they possess a potential financial conflict of interest in a par-
ticular protocol should withdraw from review of that protocol." 5
3. Review of Protocols Involving Financial Conflicts
The Draft Interim Guidance next sets forth criteria that the
IRB should employ when considering financial conflicts of inter-
177. Id. § 1.3.
178. Id.
179. Id. § 2.
180. Id. § 2.1.
181. Id.
182. Id. § 2.2.
183. Id.
184. Id. § 3.1.
185. Id.
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est in reviewing protocols. 86 When the IRB determines that a
financial conflict of interest exists, and that the conflict cannot
be eliminated, the Draft Interim Guidance advises the IRB to
consider modifying the consent form to reflect the financial con-
flict.18 7 Finally, the Draft Interim Guidance advises that, when an
investigator's financial conflict of interest cannot be eliminated,
the investigator "should not be directly engaged in aspects of the
trial that could be influenced inappropriately by that conflict.
These could include: the design of the trial, monitoring the trial,
obtaining the informed consent, adverse event reporting, or ana-
lyzing the data."18 In those instances, the Draft Interim Gui-
dance recommends that the consent document disclose the
financial conflict, including the financial arrangement and how
the institution plans to manage it. 1
8 9
C. Government Response: Human Research Subject Protections
Act of 2002
In May 2002, Representative Diana DeGette introduced the
Human Research Subject Protections Act of 2002 ("2002
186. Id. § 4.
187. Id. § 4.3. In determining whether and how to modify the consent
form, the draft interim guidance suggests that the IRB consider the following
questions:
1. Who is the sponsor?
2. Who designated the clinical trial?
3. Who will analyze the safety and efficacy data?
4. Is there a Data Safety Monitoring Board (DSMB)?
5. What are the financial relationships between the Clinical Investi-
gator and the commercial sponsor?
6. Is there any compensation that is affected by the study outcome?
7. Does the Investigator have any proprietary interests in the product
including patents, trademarks, copyrights, and licensing
agreements?
8. Does the Investigator have equity interest in the company-pub-
licly held company or non-publicly held company?
9. Does the Investigator receive significant payments of other sorts?
(e.g., grants, compensation in the form of equipment, retainers
for ongoing consultation, and honoraria)
10. What are the specific arrangements for payment?
11. Where does the payment go? To the Institution? To the
Investigator?
12. What is the payment per participant? Are there other arrange-
ments?
188. Id. § 4.4.
189. Id. § 5.3.
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Research Act") into the House of Representatives.' 9" Prior to the
bill's introduction, many journalists focused their attention on
the issue of the protection of research subjects.'9 1 The bill, how-
ever, which calls for reform in the very industry the journalists
criticized, received little recognition after its introduction.
19 2
Despite the bill's lack of recognition, it calls for many of the same
changes that journalists and patient advocates recommended in
their criticisms of current practice rules. The bill calls for the
harmonization of FDA and HHS regulations, establishes the sub-
ject's legal right to informed consent and provides guidelines for
disclosure, and better defines the roles and requirements of
IRBs. 193
1. Uniform Regulations
Current regulations of human subject research vary widely.
The regulations vary based on the sponsor, the type of institution
conducting the research, the type of research, and even the pop-
ulation of research subjects.19 4 HHS and FDA regulations do not
always provide consistent guidance.19
The 2002 Research Act requires a review of those inconsis-
tencies and, where possible, harmonization of the regulations.1 9 6
Understanding that issues involved in human subject research
may be unique to either FDA or HHS research, the 2002
Research Act allows for differences in the regulations only when
they are necessary to reflect those issues, whether legal or factual,
that are unique to research under only one set of regulations.
1 97
While the 2002 Research Act does not limit the issues that must
undergo review for harmonization, it does require review of
some specific issues, including regulations of significant financial
190. Human Research Protections Act of 2002, H.R. 4697, 107th Cong.
(2002).
191. See Michael D. Lemonick & Andrew Goldstein, At Your Own Risk,
TIME, Apr. 22, 2002, at 46 (cover story), and Duff Wilson & David Heath, Unin-
formed Consent: What Patients At 'The Hutch' Weren't Told About Experiments In
Which They Died, SEATrLE TIMES, Mar. 11-15, 2001 (investigative report, Pulitzer
Prize nominee).
192. One special report, published in August 2002, briefly mentions the
bill. Tom Abate, Experiments On Humans: Rules for Clinical Trials Are Confusing,
Inconsistent; No Single Agency Regulates Medical Research On Humans, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 5, 2002, at Al.
193. H.R. 4697, §§ 2, 3.
194. See Tom Abate, supra note 192. Criticizing this variation in regula-
tions, some critics assert that rules regulating research on monkeys are more
consistent than the rules that regulate research on humans.
195. See supra notes 118-59 and accompanying text.
196. H.R. 4697, § 2.
197. Id.
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interests and requirements for a researcher's confirmation of the
protection of the research participants.19 The 2002 Research
Act, however, does not provide any guidance on whether the reg-
ulations should favor or discourage financial conflicts of interest,
instead leaving that determination to the HHS Secretary.
2. Informed Consent
While the current informed consent doctrine evolved from
case law, and statutory provisions for informed consent left many
issues to the physician's discretion, the 2002 Research Act sets
forth the specific information that a clinical investigator must dis-
close when obtaining informed consent.199 That information
includes any conflict of interest the investigators have. 200 Inter-
estingly, the bill requires the informed consent disclosures to
include any conflicts of interest, which arguably prevents
researchers from exercising their own judgment regarding
whether a particular conflict is too insignificant to disclose.
3. Institutional Review Boards
The 2002 Research Act pays particular attention to IRBs. It
sets forth membership requirements and requires continuing
education for IRB members, provisions for situations in which an
IRB member either has, or appears to have, a conflict of interest
regarding research submitted to the IRB, and a review of a
clinical investigator's conflict of interest.20 1
In contrast to current IRB membership requirements, the
2002 Research Act requires at least two members who possess sci-
entific expertise and two members whose primary expertise
relates to non-scientific areas.20 2 The 2002 Research Act, how-
ever, provides that these requirements represent minimum num-
bers, and scientific experts should each compose at least twenty-
five percent of the IRB's membership, while non-scientific
198. Id. The other differences required to undergo review are the provi-
sions for research that relates to emergency intervention and the definition of
"institution," which may determine how the regulations apply to a particular
study. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. Other information includes, but is not limited to: the purpose of
the research; potential risks and benefits of participating in the research; the
difference, if any, between the research and other therapeutic treatment; a
statement giving the participant the right to leave the study at any time; the
identity of the research sponsors; and any tests or procedures that are part of
the research. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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experts should compose no less than twenty percent of the total
membership.2 3 In addition, at least two IRB members, but no
less than twenty percent of the IRB's members, should include
members who do not affiliate with the particular institution.2"4
The Act provides, however, that the same person can satisfy both
the non-scientific expert requirement and the non-affiliation
requirement for purposes of satisfying the Act's requirements. 20 5
In addition to altering an IRB's membership requirements,
the 2002 Research Act creates provisions for continuing educa-
tion of IRB members and for situations involving conflicts of
interest.206 Recognizing the importance of an IRB's sensitivity to
ethical issues involved in certain types of medical research, the
2002 Research Act requires institutions to develop orientation
programs for new IRB members and continuing education pro-
grams for existing IRB members, including a continuing educa-
tion program with respect to ethical issues that relate to the
particular research the IRB reviews.20 7 Presumably, those contin-
uing education programs could serve to educate IRB members in
issues specific to the type of research they review, including risks
associated with conflicts of interest. The 2002 Research Act pro-
vides for reporting such conflicts of interest. In the case of an
IRB member with a conflict of interest, the 2002 Research Act
requires the member to report that conflict to the institution,
while the institution should report any institutional or investiga-
tor conflicts of interest to the IRB. 20 Interestingly, the 2002
Research Act does not create different reporting requirements
for real versus perceived conflicts of interest, indicating that a
perceived conflict of interest, even in the absence of a true conflict
of interest, merits the same attention as a real conflict of inter-
est.20 9 Those conflicts of interest may include an IRB member's
involvement as an investigator in the research, any proprietary
203. Id.
204. Id. Affiliation includes immediate family members of anybody who
is affiliated with the institution, or any person who can identify a conflict of
interest. Id.
205. Id. In addition to the general membership requirements, when an
IRB reviews a proposal for research designed to include either a "vulnerable
population" or a significant minority population, the IRB must include in its
membership a representative of that particular population. Id. "Vulnerable
populations" include the children, pregnant women, the mentally ill, prisoners,
and the economically or educationally disadvantaged. HHS Protection of
Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2001).
206. H.R. 4697, § 2.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
20031
210 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
interests in the research, or any direct financial relationships or
arrangements with a study's private sponsor.21 ° If IRB members
report their own conflicts of interest, the 2002 Research Act
requires them to excuse themselves from IRB review of that par-
ticular study.2 1 ' While the 2002 Research Act does not ban con-
flicts of interest, it does require an institution to seek to reduce
or eliminate and oversee any perceived or real conflicts.2 12
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the 2002 Research Act addresses many of the con-
cerns articulated by patient advocates, among others, it does not
address the concerns relating to an IRB's effectiveness. Allega-
tions of misconduct, whether due to financial conflicts of interest
or not, raise questions of the effectiveness of IRB review. While
IRBs currently act to ensure the safety of clinical trials, regula-
tions, time constraints, and internal pressures limit their effec-
tiveness. To remedy those limitations, changes within
institutions and the research industry and changes in the law
should delegate a more active and independent role to IRBs, as
well as establish more government oversight of research compli-
ance. Increasing the effectiveness of IRBs, and decreasing mis-
conduct in clinical research, requires, at the outset, three
fundamental changes that will provide a foundation for future
regulations and that can adapt to changes in technology and the
research industry. First, both institutions and government orga-
nizations should strive to strengthen the role of IRBs. Next, the
government should establish an oversight body to promulgate
and enforce rules regarding clinical research. Finally, all clinical
research should fall under those rules. These recommendations,
while broad in scope, will provide a basis for better regulation of
clinical research and improve overall confidence in medical
research.
A. Strengthen the Role of IRBs
IRBs, which by law interact with individual research institu-
tions and clinical trials, represent the best available opportunity
to recognize and prevent research misconduct. Because
researchers and research institutions must present proposed
studies to IRBs for approval before the study can commence,
IRBs have the opportunity to prevent research that represents
too great of a risk, or can ensure that researchers and institutions
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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put adequate safeguards into place to prevent serious harm to
research subjects. Unlike a government agency, an IRB can take
a proactive role, by identifying potential problems before they
occur. A government agency, on the other hand, if charged with
the same task as an IRB, could potentially be stretched too thin,
thus only able to identify problems after they occur, when an
institution reports the problem to the agency. Currently, how-
ever, the law does not assure effective IRB review. Institutions
and their review boards can strengthen the role of IRBs by ensur-
ing complete independence, continuous monitoring, a relative
reduction in the IRBs workload, and establishing a Conflicts of
Interest Committee at each institution. These steps will allow the
IRB to successfully implement recommendations such as those in
the Draft Interim Guidance.
1. IRBs Should Be Completely Independent of Institutions
The current law requires that at least one IRB member be
completely independent of the institution, while the 2002
Research Act modifies that requirement. An IRB with the legal
minimum of five members, then, would easily outnumber the
independent members representing a minority of the board, cre-
ating potential conflicts of interest within the IRB itself. As a
result, the very committee that should protect patients from the
harm that can result from conflicts of interest may sacrifice its
own objectivity in its review of clinical trials. An independent insti-
tutional review board, on the other hand, whose independent
members possess both scientific and non-scientific backgrounds,
compose at least 50% of the IRB's membership, and which repre-
sents the community at large, not only presents the image of
objectivity, but also can be truly objective in reviewing research
protocols.
2. IRBs Should Engage in Continuous, Interactive Monitoring
While the law currently charges IRBs with continuous moni-
toring of clinical research, in reality IRBs often, if they do engage
in continuous monitoring, merely monitor paperwork submitted
by research team members. A policy that requires IRBs to
engage in interaction with research team members and patients,
as well as monitor paperwork submitted by the research team,
will alert an IRB to potential problems that may arise during the
course of the research. Likewise, a policy that encourages this
interaction will convey an institution's commitment to both com-
pliance with the law and patient protection, thus building patient
2003]
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and community trust in the integrity of the research and the
institution.
3. An IRB's Workload Should Be Reduced
Finally, to implement a policy that requires continuous,
active review of research requires that an IRB's workload be
evenly distributed, with adequate resources for the IRB to engage
in effective monitoring. Time represents the IRB's most critical
resource. IRB members often face an overwhelming task, where
some IRBs at large institutions monitor more than one thousand
clinical trials at a time. Without a reduction in its workload, an
IRB simply cannot spend enough time effectively monitoring
clinical trials. In fact, a 1996 General Accounting Office study
found that many IRBs often spend only one to two minutes of
review per study.213 Reducing an IRB's workload may include
appointing more than one IRB to larger institutions, or possibly
delegating tasks to smaller committees composed of IRB
members.
4. Institutions Should Establish a Conflict of Interest
Committee
As suggested by the Draft Interim Guidance, institutions
should establish Conflict of Interest Committees, whose sole
responsibility is to review the institution's and the investigator's
conflicts of interest, particularly financial conflicts, and submit a
report and recommendation to the IRB. A Conflict of Interest
Committee should establish uniform criteria to apply to all con-
flicts, taking into consideration the role that the investigator with
the conflict plays in implementing the protocol, ensuring that an
independent investigator is in a position to oversee and manage
investigators with financial conflicts, requiring annual audits of
protocols to review financial conflicts, and ensuring that the insti-
tution implements policies and procedures to eliminate any dan-
ger that its financial conflicts may present to patients.
The IRB's role in evaluating the Conflict of Interest Com-
mittee's report and recommendation should include a determi-
nation of the frequency of review during the research and a
determination of what, if any, financial conflict information mer-
its disclosure in the patient consent form.
213. GEN. Accr. OFF., SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: CONTINUED VIGILANCE CRITI-
CAL IN PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS (1996), at http://www.gao.gov (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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B. Establish One Agency to Oversee All Clinical Research
While IRBs provide the first line of defense against unethical
research, a government agency that is charged with overseeing
research in general, and promulgating rules regarding research
in particular, can provide a set of standards for IRBs, institutions,
and research teams to follow in designing and implementing
studies. Currently, that task falls to the OHRP. The OHRP, how-
ever, only oversees research that falls under HHS regulations.
Additionally, the FDA only monitors research that falls under
FDA guidelines. Creating one agency, however, could ensure
effective and efficient oversight, with the ability to adapt to the
changing research environment and changes in technology.
Rather than complying with the laws of multiple government
agencies, institutions, investigators, and IRBs could look to the
single government agency and its uniform standards.
In establishing one agency to oversee clinical research, the
agency should be granted the authority to oversee all medical
research, thus providing safeguards for all patients in all studies.
While current laws apply only to federally funded research or
research involving drugs or treatments that must submit to FDA
approval, oversight of all clinical research will ensure that all
patients receive equal protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
The OHRP's Draft Interim Guidance and institutional policy
changes like those recommended by The Hutch's Patient Protec-
tion Committee present varied responses to the problems
presented by financial conflicts of interest in human subject
research. While financial conflicts of interest are a relatively new
issue in human subject research, conflicts of interest have always
existed for investigators. From the promise of prestige to the
pursuit of knowledge, medical researchers have always had a
stake in the outcome of human subject research and, while finan-
cial interests represent a significant incentive in certain out-
comes, medical researchers generally preferred one outcome
over another even before they encountered financial interests.
The changes in medical research funding, leading to more
private than public funding, the surge of biotechnology stock in
the 1980s, and the move toward for-profit health care, led to
increasing occurrences of financial agreements in medical
research. On the other hand, the increase in private funding, in
addition to the wealth created by biotechnology stock, resulted
in an increase in medical research, benefiting both individual
patients, future patients, and society. Eliminating financial con-
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flicts of interest could potentially drastically reduce the amount
of medical research and slow the movement to the discovery of
cures or more effective treatments for numerous medical condi-
tions. Financial incentives, therefore, play an important role in
medical research; eliminating them may devastate the research
community.
While financial conflicts of interest should not be eliminated
altogether, they can be minimized and managed. Institutional
Review Boards are in the best position to manage these conflicts.
IRBs should strive to exercise independent judgment in deter-
mining whether to approve a research protocol, what to disclose
in the patient's consent form, and how to manage financial con-
flicts of interest.
The IRB should determine whether to disclose financial
conflict information in the patient consent form based, in addi-
tion to the issues posed by the Draft Interim Guidance,214 on
both the potential benefits to the patient (in other words, the
underlying reason behind the patient's decision to consider par-
ticipating in the protocol), and the alternative therapies that are
available to the patient. A terminally ill patient, for instance, may
consider participation because it represents the only potential
cure, while a healthy volunteer may choose to participate for the
benefit of society. In the middle of this spectrum is the patient
who may choose to participate in the protocol, even though alter-
native proven therapies are available. While a terminally ill
patient with no other alternatives may place little importance on
financial incentives the investigator may have, a healthy volun-
teer or a patient with alternative treatment choices may take
those conflicts into consideration when determining whether to
participate in the protocol.
The IRB's role is to protect each of these patients. The
healthy volunteer and the patient with alternative treatment
choices can be protected by adequate disclosures of conflicts and
disclosures of the institution's and the IRB's policies and proce-
dures to manage those conflicts. The IRB can protect the termi-
nally ill patient from an investigator's financial conflicts by
ensuring that adequate safeguards are put into place, thus moni-
toring the protocol and, should the financial interests cloud the
investigator's judgment, assuring that the patient is adequately
represented in obtaining a remedy and determining the next
course of treatment, including whether to continue the protocol
under a new investigator or to terminate the protocol. One
potential pitfall of requiring a patient consent form to disclose all
214. See supra note 187.
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financial conflicts, rather than only those that an IRB determines
merit disclosure, is a long, confusing patient consent form, clut-
tered with disclosures regarding insignificant conflicts of interest.
While informed consent does not, by itself, make research
ethical, it is one safeguard that an IRB can implement to ensure
patient protection. In addition, institutions and researchers
should strive to not only create a culture of compliance, but a
demonstrated commitment to patient protection, where patient
protection is a principal factor in determining the next course of
action, rather than another hurdle to overcome in implementing
the next course of action. Such safeguards, implemented after
considering the ethical principals identified in the Belmont
Report, along with continuous, interactive monitoring of the
clinical trials, allows an IRB, institution, and its research teams to
focus on protecting patients, while developing beneficial treat-
ments and medicine. Each institution, community, patient, and
protocol is unique, and that uniqueness should be factored into
each disclosure decision. While financial conflicts may never be
fully eliminated, institutions and their IRBs can ensure that those
conflicts do not damage the patient's integrity and autonomy.
Using patients for profit is never acceptable, and IRBs, institu-
tions, and clinical investigators should implement those policies
and procedures that ensure that each patient is protected from
overzealous decisions that result from a financial conflict. Even
when a government agency does issue clear guidelines to manage
financial conflicts, institutions and IRBs should continually
review and, if necessary, revise their policies and procedures to
reflect changes in research funding, the research community,
and the changing needs of patients.
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